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Any survey of the coverage of the Americans With Disability Act (ADA)'
must involve an examination of the extent to which Congress can, or
should, legislate about the significance of the personal makeup of the
American worker. For purposes of addressing this question, this essay
will focus on bringing two particular applications of the ADA under
careful scrutiny. The first of these areas, the human gene, requires the Act
to achieve a proper balance between that which is within the realm of
scientific capability, that which is desirable within the context of human
privacy, and that which is appropriate as a subject of legislative
intervention.
The immediacy of the challenge of human genetics has been
highlighted by the progress of the Human Genome Project, which aims to
analyze the crucial role genes play in matters of health and disease as its
goal.2 Here, because of the immense potential for both beneficial use as
well as widespread abuse of the knowledge to be gained from unlocking
the mysteries of the human genetic composition, serious attention must be
given to the degree to which society intends to permit an individual's
future to be determined on the basis of the sometimes vague possibilities
and uncertain predispositions that may be suggested through the use of
genetic testing.
Secondly, the human mind presents an equally important subject as
to the extent to which the government should be involved in the business
"B.A., St. Louis University, 196S; J.D., St. Louis University College of La,; 1971; M B A,
Northern Illinois University, 19S4; LLM. (Health), DePaul University College of Law., 1992
'42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.; Pub. L. 101-336, July 26, 1990, 104 Stat- 327
2The Human Genome Project, U.S. Department of Health and Human Scr. ice:, NIL
Publication No. 90-1590, Apr., 1990, p. 5.
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of safeguarding those suffering the effects of mental illness and disability.3
Arguably, it was to combat misconceptions such as these that Congress
enacted the ADA legislation in 1990 "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals
with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic
and social mainstream of American Life."4 However, a certain level of
confusion persists in trying to determine the scope of protection Congress
actually intended to afford the mentally challenged when it included
employees with mental disorders as a protected class under the Act.
Looking at the legislative history of the ADA, its seems that Senator
Humphrey accurately predicted the present day interpretation problems
with the Act when he commented:
While the committee report gives examples of clear cut
accommodations for the [physically] disabled, it studiously avoids
the more bizarre accommodation requirements imposed by the bill.
What are employers expected to do to accommodate alcoholics, the
mentally retarded, or persons with neurotic or psychotic disorders?
This Senator has no idea and I doubt that other Senators do either
5
While there is no significant digtinction in the language of the ADA
regarding the protection to be afforded to employees with physical or
mental disabilities, in reality, the problems, fears, suspicions and
stereotypes visited upon the employee with a history of mental disorders
present very unique problems.
In the process of generally examining the protections and intrusions
which American workers may reasonably expect under the provisions of
the ADA, this article will place emphasis on those provisions of the Act
which are of particular concern to employees suffering from disabling
mental conditions or diagnosed with genetic predispositions. Finally, this
article will comment upon the extent to which the Americans With
Disabilities Act is capable of providing equal, adequate and effective
protection for the mentally or genetically troubled employee against
challenges not contemplated at the time of its enactment.
'Louis Peckman, Coping With Mental Disabilities In The Workplace, N.Y. STATE B.J. July-
Aug. 1995, at 26.
4House Comm. On Educ. And Labor, Ameticans with Disabilities Act of 1990, H.R. Rep.
No. 485, 101 t Cong. 2d Sess. Pt. 2 at 22 (199), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267.
5135 Cong. Rec. 10,783 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989).
[Vol 2:291292
1998] GENETIC & MENTAL DISORDERS UNDER ADA 293
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
With the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,6 Congress planted the
seeds that would eventually grow into the basis for universal protection of
the disabled against workplace discrimination. Originally somewhat
limited in scope, and designed as protective legislation only applicable to
certain federal employees and those working with federal contractors, the
Rehabilitation Act mandated that: "No otherwise qualified [handicapped]
individual .. in the United States[,] ... shall, solely by reason of her or his
[handicap], be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance...."
In Section 706(8)(B), the Act defines a handicapped person as "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record
of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."2
Major life activities were defined as including "functions such as caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning and working."9
With the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, the substantive rights
of handicapped workers, whether mentally or physically impaired, were
given formal recognition and officially safeguarded, provided that the
disabled applicant was otherwise qualified for the position in question. In
short, Congress intended "to share with handicapped Americans the
opportunities for ... jobs that other Americans take for granted.""'
In implementing the protections Congress extended to handicapped
workers under the Rehabilitation Act, the United States Supreme Court
determined in the leading case of Southeastern Community College v.
Davis that, "in the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is
one who can perform the 'essential functions' of the job in question.""
This case gave the Court the opportunity to define the scope of the class
protected by the Rehabilitation Act as including not only currently
6Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, Sept. 26, 1979; 29 U.S&C. § 701 ctscq.
729 U.S.C. § 794.
'29 U.S.C. § 706 (8)(B).
945 C.F.R. 84.3 (j)2)(ii).
10123 Cong. Rec. 13515 (1977) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
11442 U.S. 397 (1979); see also 45 C.F.R. 84.3(k) (1985).
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disabled workers but also those who may have a record of impairment but
who, at present, are asymptomatic or "may have no actual incapacity at
all.' 2 The later part of the Court's statement incorporates a critical
concept when dealing with employee genetic or mental conditions under
the ADA, as these conditions may frequently be episodic in nature or
characterized solely by a potential future impairment. Two later cases
provided additional impetus to the Act's evolutionary process by
presenting occasion for the courts to further broaden the holding of
Southeastern. By finding a protective intent under fhe Act for individuals
suffering from disabilities which did not necessarily involve open and
physically obvious signs of handicap, safeguards were unquestionably
extended to individuals suffering from a wider range of more subtly
manifested conditions.
The first of these cases, School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline, 13 was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1987 and
clearly brought those suffering from contagious diseases within the
protective arm of the Rehabilitation Act. In that case, Gene Arline, a
teacher who experienced periodic and recurring episodes of tuberculosis,
was found to be a handicapped individual within the meaning of Section
504.14 The second case, Chalk v. U.S. District Court Central District of
California,5 was decided one year later by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In this case, the Court found Vincent L. Chalk, a teacher
diagnosed with AIDS, to be suffering from a condition covered by the
Act, and allowed him to return to the classroom absent a showing of direct
and immediate risk to his students. 6 The general implication of this
decision for the workplace was the Court's holding that speculation of
future harm or a theoretical, undefined threat of injury to others could not
be used as a pretext for discriminatory employment decisions unless based
upon a reasonable degree of supporting medical evidence. 7 Of particular
note here, in terms of its application to mentally and genetically disabling
conditions, is the Court's approval of the rejection in Ray v. School
2442 U.S. at 405-06; see also Ker K. Gould, And Equal Participation for All ... The
Americans With Disabilities Act in the Courtroom, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 123, 131.
"SO U.S. 273 (1987).
14Pub. L. 93-112 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
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District of DeSoto County of employment decisions based upon
"pernicious mythologies" or "irrational fear."'18 Accordingly, with the
Court's express finding that coverage under the Rehabilitation Act also
applies to individuals impaired by disabilities other than overtly and
strictly physically limiting handicaps, the scope of the Act's protection
was expanded to encompass the often complex range of hidden disorders
suffered by the mentally and genetically impaired employee.
9
Apparently encouraged by the success of the Rehabilitation Act in
dealing with discrimination problems of the handicapped in the relatively
small arena of federal contractors, and satisfied with the manner in which
the courts were interpreting and applying the protections of the Act in the
workplace, Congress next undertook the ambitious task of making
legislatively mandated disability protection available to nearly all
American workers. The result of this effort was the framing of the
Americans With Disabilities Act.
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
The logical outgrowth of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the passage
of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). " More ambitious
in its scope than the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA went beyond recipients
of federal funding and federal contracts as the regulated target group to
ultimately encompass all employers with fifteen or more employees.2'
Yet, despite the fact that Congress elected to broadly extend new statutory
protections to millions of potential claimants alleging victimization by
discriminatory employment practices, the history of the Act clearly
indicated little consideration was given to the interplay between the ADA
and genetics, genetic characteristics and genetic predictions of
susceptibility to disease, disability or early death.2- Likewise, a sparse
legislative record leaves similar uncertainty as to the extent of recourse
"666 F. Supp. 1524, 1536 NI.D. Fla. 1987) (citing Arline, 80 U.S. 13 it 1129-30)
19Id.
"
0See supra note 1.
2142 U.S.C.A. § 1211 1(5)(A).
'Dee Lord, Something in the Genes, EEOC Takes Steps to Forestall DiscrminatJon for
Predisposition to Illness, 82 Apr A.B.A.J. 86.
2 5
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Congress actually intended the Act to provide for the special problems of
the mentally impaired.23
On its face, the language which Congress chose to employ in
enacting the ADA is broadly structured to bring employees suffering from
a wide variety of conditions squarely within the intended protections of
this Act. However, today, nearly seven years after its enactment, debate
continues and the law is still evolving as to those particular circumstances
under which the ADA should be applied to situations involving employee
mental and genetic disorders. Because the interpretations given to the Act
on mental and genetic issues by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)24 have frequently been absent, unclear or reflective
of significant position shifts, no consensus has yet been reached as to any
clearly defined parameters of the Act's coverage in dealing with mentally
disabled or genetically impaired employees.
As mentioned above, the starting point for analyzing the ADA and
its applicability to genetic problems and mental disabilities begins with
the bank of precedent established through judicial interpretation of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, from which the ADA was cloned. With its
use of identical terms and parallel phrases, Congress confirmed the
precedents set under the Rehabilitation Act and adopted its judicial history
as the applicable law to be used in interpreting the ADA.25
The similarities between the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the
ADA become apparent with even a cursory examination of the two
legislative texts. "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge
of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." 26 The ADA goes on to define
a "qualified individual with a disability" as meaning "an individual with
2'Id.
2442 U.S.C.A. § 12116, 12117. The EEOC is the agency charged with policing the ADA.
2H.R. No. 485, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., pt 2 at 72 (199)S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. at 38 (1989); see also Loretta K. Haggard, Reasonable Accommodation OfIndividuals With
Mental Disabilities and Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343, 350 (1993); Soileau v. Guilford
of Maine, 928 F. Supp. 37 (D.C. Mo. 1996) (citing Bolton v. Scrivner, 36 F. 3d 939, 943 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
2642 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (a); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.
at 794.
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a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employee position that such individual holds
or desires." 27 Thus, having identified the group of workers targeted for
the Act's protection, the next step is to explore the specific provisions of
the ADA which attempt to define, more particularly, the protected
disabling conditions.
With either careless oversight or brilliant foresight, Congress
accomplished the task of defining the protected conditions under both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in amorphous terms capable of
being molded to fit an ever widening set of claimed disabilities, diagnosed
disorders and exploding technological advancements. This flexibility is
well attuned to dealing with employee mental and genetic problems as it
gives the Act the ability to adapt and respond to both the changing and
often conflicting theories of mental health professionals and to the rapidly
expanding map of the human genome. In this regard, Congress
determined that, with respect to an individual, the term "disability" means:
(A) physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.2
In its Rules and Regulations implementing the Act, the EEOC has
clarified the basic definition of a disability under the ADA as including
the essential element that any disability claimed by an employee must also
substantially limit a major life activity such as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning and working," 9 in order to be recognized as protected under the
Act. To this core concept of a disabled employee entitled to coverage
under the ADA, the interpretations and safeguards provided by seminal
Rehabilitation Act cases such as Arline and Chall,3 became immediately
applicable and have set the tone for determining the scope of the ADA's
2742 U.S.C.A. §12111(8).
2'42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A)(B) and (C).
229 C.F.R. Part 1630, July 26, 1991.
"'See supra notes 13 and 15.
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impact upon employee genetic problems and mental impairments. As
such, the extent to which mental and genetic disorders can be found to be
protected by the Act will depend upon the ability of the individual
claimant to bring his or her particular circumstances within the protective
language of the ADA definition of disability, as interpreted by the EEOC
and implemented by the courts.
EEOC RULES AND REGULATIONS
The EEOC stands as the primary agency responsible for the interpretation
of the ADA as it is generally applied in the workplace.3 Accordingly, it
is worthwhile to examine the constraints placed upon courts reviewing
ADA based employee discrimination claims as to the degree of deference
accorded to the first line interpretations of the agency.
Generally stated, the authority with which an administrative agency
acts in carrying out its duties can be summarized as follows:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate specific provisions of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight, unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes, the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather
than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrative agency.32
However, the rule making authority of the administrative agency is neither
unfettered nor absolute. In every case, the keystone of the interpretive
process is the statute itself.3 3 The sole function of the court in such
3 Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act deals with all aspects of employment, while
Titles II and III deal with government and public accommodations. Title IV is involved with tele-
communications issues (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).
32Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
33Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 299 (1989),
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instances is to enforce the statute, as written, when the statutory language
is clear and unambiguous.34
For the most part, there appears to be widespread agreement that,
when an administrative agency has been charged by Congress with the
oversight of a particular statute, the interpretations of the agency are to be
given considerable deference. 5 Still, limitations can be placed on the
statutory interpretation authority of an administrative agency which
impact upon the weight to be given to the agency's published directives,
depending upon the type of rule or regulation involved.'
An administrative agency can issue two types of rules; legislative
rules and interpretive rules. Legislative rules are those rules directed
towards implementing and interpreting regulations that have been open to
public notice and comment procedures prior to adoption and publication."
Rules of this sort are given considerable deference by the courts. On the
other hand, when issuing interpretive rules, the agency does not seek
comments from the public. Instead, distribution of rules occurs
unilaterally as a general public advisory of the agency's construction of
the statutes and rules it has been charged to administer., For the most
part, the EEOC pronouncements relating to the ADA fall into the category
of interpretive procedures.
When faced with agency interpretative rules such as those issued by
the EEOC in administering the ADA, a court may find the information
provided to be persuasive, but it is not compelled to give an interpretive
ruling binding effect and "always has the power to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency rule."39 As such, the Court in Shalala v. St. Paid-
Ramsey Medical Center found the impact of an interpretive rule upon the
court should be viewed "as mere agency statements which provide
guidance to parties but which do not have the force of law."'
In short, although the involvement of the EEOC in the ADA
interpretive process was, undoubtedly, designed to clarify Congressional
"West Virginia Univ. Hosps., v. Casey, 499 U.S. S3, 84 (1991).
3'Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 at 141, (1982); sce also Chevron, 467 U.S at 043-44
6Raymond v. Ramire, 918 F. Supp. 12S0, 1292 (N.D. lowa 1996).
3"Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 115 S.Ct 1232, 1239 (1995),
3"Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1996); Ernployer3 lnzrtwrac
of Wausau v. Browner, 52 F.3d 656,666 (7th Cir 1995), ccrt. dcnicd, 116 S Ct 699, 133 L Ed 656
(1996).
9Shalala, 115 S.Ct. At 1239 (quoting Chrysler Corp v. Brow-n, 441 U S. 2S1, 302 1 1979pj
4
'Shalala v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 50 F.3d 522,527 in n.4 (Sth Cir. 19951,
299
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purpose and streamline administration, publication of the agency's views
regarding the scope of the Act's coverage has not always resulted in a
harmony of interpretation between the EEOC and the courts.
UNIQUE GENETIC CONSIDERATIONS
UNDER THE ADA
The Early EEOC Position Regarding Genetic Disorders
From the beginning, the effort to determine the extent to which Congress
meant the ADA to provide protection for genetically influenced conditions
has been hampered by the fact that the legislative history of the ADA
contains little authoritative guidance4' and the language of the Act is silent
regarding matters of genetics. Despite technological advances which were
being made in the field of human genetics during the seveneteen years
between the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act and passage of the ADA,
the original interpretive rules and regulations issued by the EEOC for the
ADA were published without providing any in depth reference or
direction regarding genetic disorders. With this void in EEOC interpretive
guidance, the EEOC effectively delegated responsibility to the courts to
decide the extent to which the protective provisions of the ADA could
reasonably be extended in matters of genetic discrimination.
Initially, on the few occasions when the EEOC did provide any
comment on genetically related issues, the tenor of the remarks was
clearly set in the direction of denying ADA coverage to claimed genetic
disabilities which were not characterized by presently manifested effects.
Early on, the EEOC began to emphasize this exclusion by declaring that
physical impairments do no include "characteristic predispositions to
illness or disease." 42  Although this pronouncement appears
straightforward and conclusive on its face as excluding genetically based
claims from protection under the ADA, implementation of the EEOC
position has been much more complex.
Over the years since passage of the ADA, internal policy exceptions
and case law decisions have chipped away at the EEOC directive that a
predisposition to illness or disease is not an ADA protected condition.
41Mark A. Rothstein, The Use Of Genetic Information For Non-Medical Purposes, 9 J. L.
&HEALTH 109, 111 (1994-1995).42Appendix to Part 160: Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h) App.
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With the inherited case law of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a line of
cases had already determined that certain consequences likely to impact
upon an individual's future health could not be used as the bases for
present discriminatory employment decisions. In the first of these cases,
Harris v. Thigpen,43 the Eleventh Circuit held that HIV positive inmates
were, indeed, handicapped individuals under the Rehabilitation Act, as
these inmates were regarded as having a physical impairment. The Court
in Thigpen rejected the EEOC position of requiring presently manifested
symptoms of the disease as a component for achieving a covered disability
classification.44 By 1993, the acceptance of asymptomatic HIV infected
individuals as a protected class under the ADA was conceded by the
EEOC in its Rules and Regulations which established that HIV infection
is "inherently substantially limiting."4
A second decision, which also considered the possibility of extending
the Rehabilitation Act to more long range considerations than just those
of presently exhibited symptoms was returned in E.E. Black Ltl. v.
Marshall.46 In this case, the Court determined the Rehabilitation Act
prevented an employer from rejecting otherwise qualified applicants on
the basis of a medical examination which suggested the individuals might
be susceptible to an increased risk of back injury.47 Clearly, despite the
traditional EEOC position that claims of discriminatory employment
practices based upon potential future impairments were not actionable as
current disabilities, the courts appeared to be moving towards an
acknowledgment that there was a place for the protection of future and
as yet asymptomatic conditions to be considered under the ADA.
In 1991, the EEOC's view as to where genetic considerations fit into
the ADA was evidenced in correspondence from its Deputy Legal Counsel
which, in a patently unequivocal summary of the EEOC's position, stated
that "the ADA does not protect individuals who are not otherwise
impaired, from discrimination based on genotype alone."4 However, this
4-3941 F.2d 1495 (1 Ith Cir. 1991).
44Id. at 1521.
4'29 C.F.R. 1630 App. 1630.20) (1993).
4497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
47Id. at 1104.4 SLetter from Elizabeth M. Thornton, Deputy Legal Counsel of the EEOC to Paul Berg ari
Sheldon Wolff, Co-Chairmen, NLX-DOE Joint Subcommittee on the Hurm Genome (AuQ 1991)
as reported by Frances H. Miller and Philip A. Huvos in Gcncatc Blucprints, Cost.OCattng ani The
Americans With Disabilities Act, 46 ADmIN L. REV. 369, 374 (1994).
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same correspondence continued on to hint at the possibility for a
qualifying genetic exception with the concession that "[s]ymptomatic
individuals, with late onset of a genetic disease may be protected by the
ADA. Such individuals are protected when they develop a genetic
disease that substantially limits one or more of their major life
activities. ' As might be expected, the lack of any clearly defined,
dispositive EEOC determination of the role of genetics under the ADA
combined with a near total absence of judicial precedent on the issue of
genetic disabilities gave rise to a considerable difference of opinion
among various commentators on the Act who simultaneously wrote: (i)
the major uncertainty is "whether the ADA covers someone who is
presymptomatic for a late onset genetic disease,"50 and (ii) that the ADA
"will protect workers from genetic discrimination by employers"51 and
(iii) the ADA "does not apply to discrimination based upon an applicant's
genetic profile."5 2 Again, as to the direction future interpretive activities
might take, there was speculation that "because presymptomatic genetic
testing was not considered during the extensive negotiations that preceded
the enactment of the ADA; and given the costs associated with further
extending the ADA's reach, it is doubtful that the ADA will be judicially
construed to protect healthy carriers of disease genes against genetic
discrimination., 53
Throughout the first years of the ADA, bringing an employee's
genetic profile within the purview of the ADA remained an uphill battle
in light of the EEOC's persistence in resisting genetically related issues
as an area covered by the ADA. Furthermore, the EEOC maintained its
position that genetics were not covered by the Act until symptomatically
manifested. For example, in responding to the proposition that the genetic
susceptibility of an individual should be covered by the ADA, the EEOC
contended:
491d.
5 See Miller and Huros, supra note 48, at 375.
5
'Therese Morelli, Genetic Discrimination By Insurers: Legal Protections Needed Front
Abuse, 9 No. 8 HealthSpan, Sept. 1992.
52Charles B. Gurd, Whether A Genetic Defect Is A Disability Under The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Preventing Genetic Discrimination By Employers, I ANNALS HEALTH L. 107,
at 118.
5 Philip R. Reilly, Public Policy and Legal Issues Raised By Advances In Genetic Screening
and Testing, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1327, 1349 (1993).
1998] GENETIC & MENTAL DISORDERS UNDER ADA 3
Everyone has hereditary genetic characteristics that predispose
them to the onset of particular illnesses or diseases that could
become disabilities under the ADA. If your grandmother had heart
disease, you may have a predisposition to heart disease. And if
your father has cancer, you may be predisposed to developing
cancer. However, the presence of these genetic characteristics does
not indicate that an individual has an impairment or a record of an
impairment, or necessarily that the individual may develop an
impairment in the future. Consequently, the Commission
determined that a characteristic predisposition to illness, like that
revealed in a family history, is no impairment covered by the
ADA. 4
Although this appeared to be a final and definitive pronouncement by
the EEOC regarding its position on matters of genetics, as will be seen,
this was, by no means, the Commission's last word on genetic disabilities.
EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.8
The outlook for the future of genetic disorders being covered by the ADA
changed abruptly on March 16, 1995, when the EEOC, without any
significant comment on its action, released an amended Section 902.8
Compliance Manual provision discussing the definition of the term
"disability" and the manner in which the ADA may be found to apply to
genetics and genetically involved diseases.55 While not providing the
force and authority of an officially promulgated Regulation, the purpose
of the Compliance Manual is to provide guidance to EEOC investigators
and the public for determining when an individual has a disability for
ADA purposes. 6 While the story carried in The Wall Street Journal on
April 10, 1995, may be somewhat overly broad in stating that workers
who have been fired or denied employment as a result of their genetic
makeup have been subjected to actionable discrimination under the
'Letter from Ronnie Blumenthal, Acting Director of Communications and Lc2islative
Affairs, EEOC, to Rep. Bob Wise, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Government Information,
Justice and Agriculture (Nov. 22, 1991) as reported by Mark A. Rothstein in Gcnctic
Discrimination in Employment And The American With Disabilities Act. 29 Hous. L. REv. 23, 46
(1992).
55EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) § 902 at 47.
5 Taken from EEOC Opinion Letter to The Honorable Patrick Johnston, Senate of the State
of California dated July 7, 1991 as reported in 7 NDLR 362.
03
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ADA,57 there is no doubt that the EEOC had definitely backed away from
its prior reluctance to even discuss genetic matters as a proper topic for
ADA coverage.
At its basic level, by including Section 902.8 in the Compliance
Manual, the EEOC effectively opened the door of the ADA for the first
time to those experiencing employment discrimination based upon genetic
characteristics.5 Additionally, the EEOC sidestepped its prior position
that a worker must have an exhibited symptom of an illness or disease as
a prerequisite for bringing a discrimination claim within the scope of
ADA protected conditions.59
The Position Of The EEOC And The
Courts On Genetic Issues
Upon closer review, the quiet shift in the EEOC's position, away from
one of adamant opposition to recognizing genetic conditions as a proper
subject of ADA coverage and toward one of mild support for addressing
genetic issues in the workplace, does not actually entail a dramatic
abandonment of any previous EEOC interpretation of the ADA. Rather,
what the Commission did was to acknowledge that the ADA applies "to
individuals who are subject to discrimination on the basis of genetic
information relating to illness, diseases or other disorders."6  In
publishing this acknowledgment, the EEOC relied upon the limited
information available in the legislative history of the Act to discern the
intention of Congress.6' In short, the thrust of the Compliance Manual
revision was directed towards emphasizing one aspect of the ADA which
the EEOC found to be particularly applicable to matters involving genetic
information. This should not, however, suggest that the traditional and
fundamental interpretation of the Commission regarding the application
of the ADA to an individual's currently asymptomatic genetic profile,
even when combined with a veritable certainty of future disabling
developments, has undergone any significant alteration. Indeed, over one
and one half years after the publication of Section 902.8, the court in
17WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1995 at Al.
S"Lord, supra note 22, at 86.
59 d.
6
'EEOC Compliance Manual, § 902.8.
61135 Cong. Rec. H4623, daily ed. July 12, 1990; see also id. at H4624-25 (Rep. Edwards)
and H4627 (Rep. Waxman).
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Wenzlaff v. Nationsbank62 relied upon the EEOC interpretive rules as
authority in quoting, verbatim, that "[t]he definition, likewise, does not
include characteristic predisposition to illness or disease." 3
Perhaps, the reason for the confusion following the release of Section
902.8, acknowledging that unlawful discrimination in the workplace based
upon genetic information may be actionable under the ADA, was a
misinterpretation of the EEOC's earlier statements on the subject of
genetics. While the widespread perception of the Section 902.8 release
was that the EEOC had somehow dramatically reversed itself on the
genetic issue, the actual fact was that the Commission remained
completely consistent in its approach to genetic matters.
As seen earlier, the EEOC had previously followed a practice of
avoiding linkage of the terms "ADA" and "genetics" in anything other
than a negative and dismissive context. 6' While, in fact, no substantive
change in the EEOC interpretive rules regarding the treatment of genetic
problems occurred on March 16, 1995, what did occur was a change in
the Commission's attitude towards its willingness to discuss and consider
the relationship between an individual's genetic composition and the
ADA. This, however, only occurred under certain limited circumstances.
In an action considerably less publicized than the distribution of
Section 902.8 of the Compliance Manual, the change in the EEOC's
attitude towards genetically connected matters began somewhat earlier
with the Commission's filing of an amicus brief in support of Bonnie
Cook's claim that she was wrongfully denied employment. 5 Ms. Cook
claimed her employer, the State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental
Health, Retardation and Hospitals had violated the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 by declining to offer employment based upon the employer's
perception that Ms. Cook was disabled due to morbid obesity.t" Although
brought under the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act, this leading case
on the "perceived" or "regarded as" theory of recovery is equally
62940 F. Supp SS9, 891 (D. Maryland. 1996); see also Gudenkauf '. Stauffer
Communications, 922 F. Supp. 465,473 (D. Kan. 1996).
6329 C.F.R. 1630.2(h) at 401 (1995).
'See EEOC Letter, supra note 60.
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applicable to cases prosecuted under the ADA 67 and, by analogy, reflects
those specific allegations necessary to qualify for review on a charge of
genetic discrimination.
In Cook, the Plaintiff, who had twice previously worked for
Defendant institution with a good work record, again applied for a
position at a time when her weight had reached 320 pounds.6 Although
found to be morbidly obese in the course of her pre-employment physical,
no finding was made that Cook was incapable of doing the job.
Nonetheless, Defendant elected not to hire Cook. 69 Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, based upon a claim that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 can
never cover morbid obesity, was denied and the case submitted to a jury
which found in Cook's favor.70
The First Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a thorough analysis of
Cook's claim and concluded that ajury could reasonably find that Plaintiff
suffered an impairment resulting from a physiological disorder which
resulted in a dysfunction of various body systems thereby causing adverse
effects on Cook's musculoskeletal, respiratory and cardiovascular
systems.71 The Court saw no merit in Defendant's position that Plaintiffs
physical condition was mutable, and within the Plaintiffs voluntary
control. Instead, the Court found that "mutability is nowhere mentioned
in the statute or regulations" and "the Rehabilitation Act contains no
language suggesting that its protection is linked to how an individual
became impaired, or whether an individual contributed to his or her
impairment."72 However, what the Court did find, which is of prime
importance when considering application of the ADA to genetically
related disorders, is that ... "[u]nder the 'regarded as' prong of Section
504, a plaintiff can make out a cognizable perceived disability claim by
demonstrating that she was treated as if she had an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity." 73
67Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723 (5th Circuit, 1995); Sutton v. United
Airlines, No. Civ. A. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917 (D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
"'10 F.3d at 20.
69Id. at 21.
7 Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 22
(1st Cir. 1993).711d. at 24.72 d. at 25.
73d.
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For those courts that have addressed the question as to whether the
ADA covers conditions which are genetically influenced, such as morbid
obesity, there has been a remarkable consistency in following the holding
in Cook. To date, for cases along this line, the question as to whether a
perceived disorder is actually genetically grounded or has physical
manifestations remains essentially irrelevant and inconsequential. Instead,
it is the employer's perception regarding the Plaintiffs condition that
draws the focus of the Court's inquiry.
With the cases decided since Cook, the emerging principal has been
that, even with arguably genetically related disorders such as obesity, the
condition alone, without more, is not, in and of itself, clearly covered by
the protections of the ADA.74 Quite to the contrary, judicial notice has
been taken of the EEOC's rule that "except in rare circumstances, obesity
is not considered a disabling impairment." s By extension, the logic of
these findings transfers directly to situations involving an individual's
entire genetic makeup and his predisposition to illness or disease.
Succinctly stated, since even a manifested, genetically linked disorder
does not automatically qualify for coverage under the ADA unless other
qualifying standards are also met, the mere possibility, or even the
probability, that an individual has or may develop a particular genetically
based disorder almost certainly, will not qualify for protection under the
Act if left to stand alone. Here, what is critical and fatal to the allegation
of unlawful discrimination, if left unproven, is the question of the
employer's perception of the plaintiffs condition as being that of a
disabled person.
As discussed above, an individual alleging employer discrimination
under the ADA must establish that the claimed disability is either (i) a
condition which substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of the individual or (ii) that the condition is perceived by the
employer as being disabling.76
74Nedder v. Rivier College, 908 F. Supp. 66, 76 (D.N.H. 1995) noting that "obasity alone
does not constitute a disabling impairment; see also Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F3d 1340, 1350 (4th
Cir. 1995) citing 29 CFR 1630.2(h).
7129 CFR 1630 App. 1630.2(j) as cited in Morrow v. City of 3acksonvlle, 941 F. Supp, 316,
821 (E.D. Ark. 1996).76Smaw v. Virginia, Dep't of State Police, S62 F. Supp. 1469, 1475 (ED. Va. 1994) (For
those claiming a disability based upon an asymptomatic genetic disorder, the third pazsibilit for
relief of"having a record of such impairment" [42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)] would be inapplicable.
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Here, a good starting point for an analysis of the proofs that are
required to bring a discrimination claim rooted in genetics within the
protective scope of the ADA is to return to the publication which opened
the door for extending the applicability of the Act to the human genome.
Section 902.8(a) of the EEOC Compliance Manual discussing the
investigation of complaints of individuals who allege that their employer
regarded them as having a disability states:
This part of the definition of "disability" applies to individuals
who are subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic
information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders. Covered
entities that discriminate against individuals on the basis of such
genetic information are regarding the individuals as having
impairments that substantially limit a major life activity. Those
individuals, therefore, are covered by the third part of the
definition of "disability., 77
The manual goes on to state that "a person who is covered because
of being regarded as having an impairment is not required to show that the
employer's perception is inaccurate ... .,78 What then, is the claimant
required to show to bring a genetically linked claim within the ADA?
In assembling the building blocks of an ADA genetic discrimination
claim, the aggrieved party must first establish (i) he or she is a person with
a disability as described in the ADA, (ii) he or she is othervise qualified
for a position, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (iii) [s]he
was terminated or subjected to an adverse decision because of the
disability.79 In the usual ADA case, this process is begun through a
showing the individual has an ADA qualified disability which is: "(a) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities; (b) has a record of having such an impairment; or (c) is
regarded as [emphasis added] having an impairment."S° The EEOC has
gone on to clarify the qualifying factors for ADA coverage of the disabled
by defining an impairment as "[a]ny physiological disorder or condition,
77EEOC Compliance Manual citing 136 Cong. Rec. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 1990)
(statement by Rep. Owens); Id. at H4624-35 (statement of Rep. Edwards); Id. at H4627 (statement
ofRep. Waxman.)78 id.
7
'Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., 883 F. Supp. 379, 394 (N.D. Iowa 1995).8Id.
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cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting ... neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory ... cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin and
endocrine .... " systems.81 The established standard for a substantial
limitation of a major life activity has been defined as the inability to
perform such functions as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working[,]" '
that "the average person in the general population can perform."'3 Once
the prima facie case has been proven through evidence establishing that
the claimant is a disabled person under the ADA, the inquiry then turns to
ascertaining whether the employer engaged in unlawful conduct under the
ADA because of the person's disability or, whether the employer
perceived or regarded the employee as being disabled and improperly
acted upon that perception, which is of crucial importance when facing
genetically linked conditions. Due to the uncertain nature of perceptions,
claims of discrimination resulting from perceived disability are fact
intensive and must be viewed on a case by case basis. As such, it is
entirely possible for an unquestionably healthy individual, with no
otherwise qualifying disability under the ADA, to find recourse under the
Act, so long as the perception of the employer is that the individual suffers
from a covered disability.84
In a recent case decided by the Eight Circuit, the court found in cases
where the Plaintiff claims to have been regarded as disabled by his
employer within the meaning of the ADA, "[t]he limiting adjective
'substantially' and 'major' indicate the perceived 'impairment must be a
significant one."'  Again, more must be proven to make a case of
perceived disability under the ADA than a showing that an employer had




'Hazeldine v. Beverage Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697,703 (S.D,N,Y. 1997).
85Kramer v. K&S Assoc., 942 F. Supp. 444, 447 (ED. Mo. 1996) (cting VOoten v.
Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1996)).
86Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996); sce also
Gerdes v. Swift-Eckrich, 949 F. Supp. 1386, 1399 (N.D. Iovwa 1996); sce also EEOC Comphance
Manual, Section 908.8(a).
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found the employee unfit for a particular job.87 What is required for a
complaint to be actionable under the ADA is the critical combination that
the employer perceived or regarded the employee as having a substantially
limiting, qualifying impairment under the Act but, also, that the employer
acted unlawfully upon that perception.88
The Cook case has set the standard for analyzing the increasing
number of "regarded as" ADA filings which have become relatively
popular over the last few years. The decisions in these cases have begun
charting the course the courts are likely to take in addressing genetic
discrimination claims and will form the cornerstone for the Act's response
to the explosive scientific progress expected from the Human Genome
Project.
UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF THE MENTALLY
DISABLED UNDER THE ADA
The EEOC Position On Mental Disorders
As with genetic issues, several similar difficulties exist in attempting to
interpret the proper application of the ADA to a covered worker's mental
condition. While, theoretically, mental and physical disabilities are
governed by the same standards, issues of mentally disabling conditions
generally present far more complex and elusive questions." For both
physically and mentally based discrimination claims, the EEOC
interpretive rules have defined a disabled employee as an individual who
has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual."90 In its view, the EEOC
has determined a qualifying mental impairment to include "any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness and specific learning disabilities."91
Also, in a recent interpretation broadening the recognition given to the
mentally challenged, the EEOC has supplemented its list of major life
87Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4!h Cir. 1986); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.20)(3): "The
term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range ofjobs in various classes .... The inability to perform a single, particular
job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."
88Forrisi, 794 F.2d at 934.
"
9See supra note 5.
9029 C.F.R. 1630.2(g)().9'29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h) (2).
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activities to include "mental and emotional processes such as thinking,
concentrating and interacting with others."92 Still, at the same time, the
list of limiting exceptions and exclusions from the definition of a
"disability" and "qualified individual with a disability" which the EEOC
includes in its reading of the Act contains several conditions which the
medical profession would generally acknowledge to be mental disorders
under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)Y3
As specified in the Act, or as interpreted by the EEOC, conditions such as
illegal drug use; 4 transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, gender identity disorder not resulting from physical
impairments or other sexual behavior disorders;9 compulsive gambling,
kleptomania, or pyromania;9 6 psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from current illegal use of drugs;97 and homosexuality and
bisexuality9" are not considered qualified disabilities. Interestingly, in
dealing with physical handicaps, neither Congress nor the EEOC has
elected to identify a comparable list of detailed, medically recognized
physical disorders which they find appropriate to exclude from the
protection of the ADA. With the exception of "temporary, non-chronic
impairments of short duration,"99 the EEOC has essentially left the
determination of qualifying physical disabilities to the courts without any
excluded categories of illness.
Another area of the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA is also
troubling because of the lack of detail regarding its intended application.
In this instance, although the EEOC has determined that the ADA is not
protective of undesirable personality traits such as poor judgment or a
quick temper, where such behavior is not a symptom of a mental or
'EEOC Compliance Manual, Volume 2, EEOC Order 915.002, § 902 (Mar. 15, 19951
"American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Stattstical Manual of MentalDzrdc rs,
Fourth Edition, Washington D.C. (1994). The current edition of this publication is commonly





"'29 C.F.R 1630.3(e). This section directly declares "homoseuality and bzeualhty are
not impairments and so are not disabilities as defined in this part." This statement ,;ould seem to
be in conflict with the tendency of the EEOC and courts to rely upon DSM defincd condition3 in
identifying mental impairments and disorders.
929 C.F.R. Pt. App. 1630.2 (j).
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psychological disorder, 00 and no distinguishing test or standard for
exclusion has ever been established. In such cases, the courts have been
left to their own devices to determine where the line is to be drawn
distinguishing between the unprotected bad employee who simply lacks
self control and social graces and the fully protected mentally impaired
employee who exhibits the identical, unacceptable workplace behavior
which the employee claims to be the manifestation of a DSM recognized
disorder.'0 ' As might be expected, the lack of a concise EEOC directive
has led to conflicting judicial decisions and inconsistent outcomes.
Because the courts are not constrained from reviewing the soundness
of EEOC interpretations and the compatibility of these interpretations with
the language and Congressional intent of the Act, or from acting where
the EEOC has chosen not to do so, the judiciary has undertaken to
interpret and shape those difficult portions of the ADA involving mental
disorders and controversies which the agency has, to date, elected to
avoid.
Fear Of Disclosure
In many respects, the problems faced by the mentally disabled in asserting
their right to protection under the ADA are completely dissimilar to the
barriers faced by physically disabled workers. Perhaps the biggest
impediment to a mentally disabled worker's exercise of his rights lies in
the disabling condition itself. While the ADA was ostensibly passed to
remedy the isolation of individuals with disabilities due to discrimination
ranging from exclusionary standards to architectural barriers0 2 and to
provide protection for those with "hidden disabilities such as ... mental
illnesses,"' 3 the mentally disabled employee often finds the hidden nature
of the disorder to be his greatest protection against discrimination. In
short, employees with mental disorders frequently succumb to the fear of
the stigma and discrimination which they anticipate as likely to result
from any disclosure of a disabling mental condition to an employer and
'0029 C.F.R. Pt. App. 1630.2(h).
01Eric E. Marcus, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA (Potential Litigation Problems of
Americans with Disabilities Act), Risk Management, Vol. 41, No. 2, (Feb. 1, 1994).
02Employment: ADA, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 817 (1996).
103EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pre-Employment Inquiries Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) No. 187 at n. 2322 citing H.R. No. 485 n. 1
pt. 2 at 72 reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355.
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co-workers and thereby, forego the full enjoyment of their rights under the
ADA.1 4  The resulting cycle of events then serves to perpetuate the
employee's inability to realize the intended benefits of the Act. As the
Court concluded in Jackson i. Boise Cascade Corp., the ADA does not
require clairvoyance on the part of the employer.L The generally
accepted rule is that it is the responsibility of the employee claiming the
mental disability or impairment to inform the employer of the need for a
reasonable accommodation as guaranteed him by the Act.IU The result,
then, is that the employee, fearing the consequences of disclosing his
mental problem, and need for accommodation to his employer, can not
claim the enabling benefits the ADA was intended to impart and may
forfeit the opportunity to achieve the independence the Act was structured
to provide to the disabled.
Appropriate Use Of The DSM
Diagnoses of mental impairments and disorders qualifying for protection
under the Act present another problematic area. While the legislative
history of the ADA contains some indication that coverage of a mentally
disabled person under the Act would depend upon the appearance of the
underlying condition in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM),0 7 various legislative exclusions were selectively
approved denying coverage under the ADA for certain mental disorders
with which Congress seems to have been morally or politically
uncomfortable. The irony of such exclusionary legislation in dealing with
conditions clearly recognized as constituting mental disorders under the
DSM is that Congress, in the course of enacting protective legislation for
the mentally disabled, openly sanctioned discriminatory employer
conduct against employees with DSM recognized disorders that are, for
the most part, wholly unrelated to the ability of the employee to perform
"
04Hilary Greer Fike, Learning Disabilities in the i'orltplacc: A Guide toADA Complance,
20 SEATrLE U. L. Rv. 489, 493 (1997).
'"Jackson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Ala. 1996); sec also Hcdbcrg
v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 92S (7th Cir. 1995); Miller v. Nat'l Cas. Co. 61 F. 3d 627 (Sth
Cir. 1995).
Ic529 C.F.R. App. 1630.0 (1995).
'07135 Cong. Rec. S10772 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Arnstrong ; see also
Keni L. Gould, And Equal Participation for All ... The Amcricans I'lth Disab:htcs Act in the
Courtroom, supra note 12, at 129.
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the essential functions of the position."' As a result, while some
conditions universally recognized as mental disorders in the medical
community may go unprotected under the ADA, the inclusion of such
conditions as the disorder of written expression now described in DSM-IV
would, arguably, qualify the employee for the full protection of the Act."0 9
In support of this argument, it would seem by creating specific, itemized
lists of conditions statutorily excluded from coverage under the ADA,
Congress intended the terms "mental impairment" and "mental disability"
to potentially include all other non-excluded mental and psychological
disorders, or at least all such disorders as are included in the DSM."0
This, then, becomes one of the serious challenges to the ADA as the Act
must adapt to changing medical opinions and emerging behavior
syndromes which work their way into and out of the repertoire of the
DSM. Still, it would be a mistake to reach the simplistic conclusion that
the DSM is the definitive arbiter of employee coverage under the ADA.
Quite to the contrary, the courts ultimately retain the obligation to
examine each individual case and decide whether the claimant qualifies
as an individual with a disability under the Act."'
Although the DSM is constantly being revised, lawyers and
legislatures tend to place enormous faith in such diagnoses and consider
them to be scientific and objective.'12 However, the mere existence of an
employee's claimed mental disability, whether classified under the DSM
or otherwise, does not alone resolve the coverage question of the ADA.
Beginning with claims rooted in the same type or classification of mental
impairment, the courts have routinely reached wide ranging and divergent
conclusions as to the circumstances under which the Act will provide
1 3Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans With Disabilities Act As A Moral
Code, 94 CoLuM.L.REv. 1451, 1467 (1994).
"
9Diagnostic Criterionfrom DSM-IV, published by the American Psychiatric Association,
Washington, D.C. describes Disorder of Written Expression as: "(A) Writing skills, as measured
by individually administered standardized test ... are substantially below those expected given the
person's chronological age, measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education. (B) The
disturbance in Criterion A significantly interferes with academic achievement or activities of daily
living that require the composition of written texts (e.g. writing grammatically correct sentences
and organized paragraphs.)"
"°Deborah Landan Spranger, Are State Bar Examiners Crazy: The Legality of Mental
Health Questions on Bar Applications Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 255, 259 (1996).
... Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992).
n2See supra note 91.
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workplace protection to the mentally disabled employee. Here, while
there is ample evidence in the legislative history of the ADA that
Congress intended, or at least allowed for, the DSM to play a part in the
implementation of the Act's protections, 13 nothing in the Act compels any
court to use the DSM when deciding a charge of illegal employer
discrimination grounded upon the employee's actual or perceived mental
condition. If, however, a court chooses to look to the DSM for guidance
in mental disability cases, it should do so with caution as has been urged
by the American Psychiatric Association." 4
Disagreement In The Courts
Unlike the situation that exists with the often visible or easily diagnosed
disabilities of physically handicapped workers, the uncertain and elusive
nature of mental illness has defied precise definition and uniform
treatment by the courts. In this area, several of the more common and
controversial problems faced by the mentally troubled worker merit
discussion.
Perhaps the most logical place to begin addressing the application of
the ADA's provisions to a mentally disabled employee is through an effort
to try and determine at what point along the spectrum of mental health the
employee becomes vested with the protections of the Act. However, as
the courts dealing with this issue have found, identifying the exact point
where ADA coverage begins is elusive and not easily achieved.
Traditionally, the EEOC has held firm in its position that it is the
untreated condition of the employee that sets the qualifying standard for
the Act. Taking the literal wording of the Act that a disability means
"physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities ...,"I5 the EEOC maintains the consideration of
disability is to be made "without regard to mitigating measures such as
.135 cong. Rec. 11,174 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 19S9): "A private entity that wishes to know
what the [ADA] might mean with respect to mental impairments , ould do % ell to turn to DSM-
lI-R." (Statement by Sen. Armstrong).
"
4 The clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of theze conditions
as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for e-iample, that tafe into
account such issues as individual responsibility, disability determination, and compztency"
[Taken from the Cautionary Statement of the American Psychiatric Association, Quicl: Rcfcrcnc0
to the Diagnostic Criteria From DSM-IV p. xi (1995).
"s42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (2)(A)
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medicines.""' 6 In the opinion of the agency, the Act fully covers those
employees who have mental illnesses which respond well to psychotropic
drugs even thought the prescribed medication results in the complete
normalization of the worker's behavior." 7 However, this interpretive
regulation has not gained universal acceptance in the courts.
In the Coghlan"8 case, which involved an insulin dependent diabetic
who would lapse into coma absent her necessary medication, the EEOC
argued that the Plaintiff was per se disabled because of a substantial
limitation of a major life activity. The agency's determination of ADA
coverage was primarily based upon a finding that the Plaintiff was likely
to lapse into a coma absent the controlling effects of her medication."1
9
The court, however, rejected this argument on the basis that the EEOC's
position would have the courts ignore the plain statutory language of the
ADA and would require reading the critical element of a limitation of a
major life activity 2 ° completely out of the Act. Essentially, the court
rejected the EEOC's argument that the Plaintiff, although not limited in
major life activities while taking proper medication, must, nonetheless, be
considered disabled because she would be so limited if the beneficial
effects of her insulin regimen were ignored as EEOC guidelines require.
Finding that "to allow such an interpretation would be to allow one having
no limitation to satisfy a condition that clearly requires limitation," the
Court went on to hold that "the EEOC's interpretive guidance ... is
directly at odds with clear statutory language."''
Another case involving a consideration of employee medication is the
Franklin'22 case, decided under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.23
This case involved a postal worker suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia. 24 Although the Court took a somewhat different route in
arriving at a finding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to relief, the effect
'1629 C.F.R. App 1630.2(h) (1995).
".EEOC Enforcement Guidance On Pre-Employment Inquiries Under The Americans With
Disabilities Act, EEOC Compliance Manual (BNA) No. 187 at N. 2322 citing H.R. No. 485 Note
I pt. 2 at 72 reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 355.
"





"'Franklin v. U.S. Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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of medical intervention on the plaintiffs behavioral pattern played a
substantial role in the Court's decision. Stating "the Court is far more
concerned with the situation in this case that the 'handicap' as
distinguished from the 'condition' is a created one," the Court held that
"[a] person suffering from the condition of paranoid schizophrenia that is
controllable by the ingestion of medication who does not take such
medication is not an 'otherwise qualified' handicapped person."'"
Taking the difficulty the mentally impaired employee faces in
evaluating the extent of protection he can expect to receive under the ADA
one step further, consideration must also be given to the possibility that
the side effects of psychotropic drugs may, themselves, constitute
substantial limitations invoking the protections of the Act and requiring
reasonable employer accommodation. This was the inference given in the
Guice-Mills,26 Dees'" and Overton"s cases discussed below.
In Dees, the Court found that "Dees has also proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the policy of holding ... meetings at
7:00 A.M. discriminated against Dees and those who like her have early
morning sedative side effects from medication by excluding them from
participation., 129 Likewise, the Court in Guice, although ultimately
denying relief on another basis, concluded that "[w]e agree with the
district court that because appellant's illness and medication regime
interfered with her ability to arrive at work on time, she was a
handicapped individual within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act."'"
Again, in a decision with a decidedly cavalier overtone, the Court in
Overton stated:
Supervisors are prone to view catnaps as inappropriate and
unprofessional, but if Overton's sleepiness is a function of his
disability (or more properly, of the treatment for his disability) and
he can still perform the essential functions of his job, then he may
still be viewed as 'qualified' under the Rehabilitation Act.FN5.
We do not mean to condone promiscuous napping. Some positions
1"5See supra note 122, at 1218-19.
12"Guice-Mills v. Dervinski, 967 F.2d 796 (2d. Cir. 1992).127Dees v. Austin Travis County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Clinic, 860 F, Supp
1186 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
""
8Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992).
"'9See supra note 126, at 1190.
t
"OSee supra note 125, at 797.
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may actually require full-time vigilance. Every position
presumably requires wakefulness for most of the working day and
at specified events. In any event, the government may presumably
require its employees to stay awake as a matter of decorum. But
this is not necessarily to say that an occasional nap would make
any federal employee unfit.'3'
In light of decisions such as these, it appears that the degree to which the
ADA requires an employer to accommodate employee behavior driven by
prescribed psychotropic medication remains a fertile area for the courts to
explore and clarify.
Stress and Depression Related Problems
In contrast to the uncertainty and divergent opinions identified with the
complex issues of disorder classification and medication related problems
discussed above, the courts have tended towards a consensus when
dealing with claims of stress or depression related disability.
In general, the attitude of the judiciary, when confronted with ADA
discrimination claims based upon workplace stress, reflects the sentiment
that "in reality, a 'stress free' environment is possible only in the grave;
simply being alive subjects everyone to stress."'32 Here, the courts have
uniformly refrained from imposing any ADA based employer requirement
to provide its workers with a stress free environment'33 which is a position
in which the EEOC concurs. Unquestionably, since all humans are prone
to experience occasional periods of anxiety, depression, stress and other
mood-related disorders, 3 4 the challenge then becomes one of discerning
which episodes of distress will warrant the Act's protection. In this area,
while some modest concession has been made by the EEOC 135 and the
'
31See supra note 127, at 1195.
"
2See supra note 98.
133Magee v. United States Postal Serv., 903 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. La. 1995); see also,
Dealing With Mental Disabilities Under the ADA, 9 LABOR LAW. 531, 539 (1993).
"
3Susan Gaylord Willis, Stress Related Disability Claims Under the ADA, 43 No. I PRAC.
LAW. 73.
I3SAmericans With Disabilities Act Technical Assistance Manual, 29 C.F.R. 1630.2.2(a)(i)
discusses stress, and depression as conditions; see also Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d
1130 (1 Ith Cir. 1996); Doe v. Regional 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
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courts136 that stress and depression may be impairments under the ADA,
recovery has frequently been denied due to the Plaintiff's failure to meet
the required standard of proof in showing that the claimed mental or
emotional condition rose to the level of limiting a major life activity."'
For these cases, the prevailing sentiment has been that the inability of an
employee to work in a particular position or with a particular person does
not trigger a covered disability or an employer obligation of
accommodation.'
s
As noted by the Court in Weiler v: Household Finance Corporation:
"[T]he ADA does not protect people from the general stresses of the
workplace. Everyone has encountered difficult situations in the working
environment. Being unwilling or even unable to work with a particular
individual simply is not the equivalent of being 'substantially limited' in
the life activity of working."'
39
Other courts have reflected a similar qualification that puts the
burden on the employee alleging illegal employer discrimination under the
ADA to establish that the claimed disability restricts the employee's
ability to perform a broad range ofjobs and not just the particular job in
question.' 4° Possibly, the position of the courts in addressing job related
stress claims is best summarized by the court in Dewitt v. Carsten which,
in denying Plaintiff's disability claim arising from the stress associated
ith being ajail sergeant, stated that "were such a complaint held to be
actionable, it would expand the scope of the ADA well beyond the scope
of illnesses that Congress has indicated it was intended to cover."''
'"See supra note 127 in which the Ovcrton court states at footnote i " "Dcpre ,lon' is a
misleadingly mild term for an extraordinarily debilitating illness."; Sec WILLI,%.1 STYro.-,
DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (Random House 1990); sec also Pntchard v. The
Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130 (11th Cit. 1996); Doe v. Regional 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1983).
137See, e.g., Overton, 977 F.2d at 1190; Pritcdard, 92 F.3d at 1130; Doe, 704 F 2d at 1402
V38See. e.g.,Overton, 977 F.2d at 1190; Pritchard, 92 F.3d at 1130,
139Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., No. 93C6454, 1995 WL 452977, at *5 July 27,
1995). The Court also went on the clarify that: "A disability is a part of someone and goes v, th
her to her next job. A personality conflict, on the other hand, is spcific to an individual .. "
"
4 Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996); Partlow v. Runyon, &26 F. Supp,
40 (D.N.H. 1994); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3).
141Dewitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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FINDING COVERAGE UNDER THE ADA
For those advocating ADA coverage for matters involving an employee's
genetic profile or mental situation, the key to the question is embedded
within the categories of a defined "disability" as outlined by the Act. As
consistently required by the cases reviewed above, the crucial element is
to bring the employee's condition within the parameters of the ADA's
definition of a disability that includes individuals having (i) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual or (ii) who have a record of such an
impairment or (iii) who are regarded as having such an impairment.'42
What steps then need to be taken to advance a grievance based upon
genetics, genetically related disorders or mental impairment which an
employee claims to be protected by the ADA?
An examination of the first possibility, an impairment substantially
limiting one or more major life activities, requires that a two part test be
satisfied. First, an impairment must currently be present and, secondly,
the impairment must cause a substantial limitation of a major life
activity.14 Obviously, an individual with an asymptomatic, potential
health disorder currently disclosed only through discovery of a particular
genetic marker would fail to satisfy one or both requirements of this
qualifying condition. 144 Similarly, unless there is an attendant interference
with a major life activity, the mere existence of a recognized mental
disability is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an actionable disability. 4 '
Even an individual presently suffering from a DSM-IV recognized mental
disorder will fail to satisfy an essential requirement and be found not to
have a disability protected by the ADA if the underlying condition fails to
interfere with a qualifying life activity.
The second avenue that can be traveled in an effort to establish an
ADA protected mental or genetic disability applies to the employee
having an historical record of an impairment that satisfies the standard of
limiting one or more major life activities. In cases of mental disturbance,
141See supra note 29.
143Id.
'44Charles B. Gurd, supra note 53.
14.29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (1995); see also Karin A. Guiduli, Challenges For The Mentally Ill
The "Threat To Safety" Defense Standard And The Use of Psychotropic Medication Under Title
I Of The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1149 at 1166 (1996).
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this second alternative is a simple fact based test, and does not require the
mental impairment be ongoing or that the employee is currently suffering
the effects of the disorder.14 6 In short, this is the situation averred to by
the Court in Southeastern, finding that the protection exists for an
employee who currently "may have no actual incapacity at all."'' 7
However, while the employee having a history of mental impairment may
find relief under this second test, the ADA again affords no relief to the
worker exhibiting only a genetic susceptibility to future illness or disease.
The critical missing element in this later instance is the genetically
effected employee would not yet have established a record of impairment
regarding an unmanifested condition which may, in fact, never actually
develop.
41
The final possibility for an employee to secure ADA coverage
requires that the individual be regarded as having the impairment in
question. This qualifying test clearly offers the most promise for
including latent genetic traits as accepted, covered disabilities under the
ADA. In meeting this test, the EEOC has determined what is intended by
the phrase "being regarded as having an impairment" is that an individual:
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a
covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment;
(2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment, or:
(3) has none of the impairments ... but is treated by a covered
entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.'
Accordingly, an employee regarded by his employer as being
mentally disabled, whether or not the employee is actually mentally
impaired, would have recourse as an individual protected under the Act.
Thus, while the mentally impaired worker may have access to the ADA's
'See. e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 US. 397 (1979)147id.
'George P. Smith, II., Assessing Genonic Information Or Safqmiardwg Gcnclc' Pht2 dc3"
9 J.L. & HEALTH 121, 125 (1994).
'4929 C.F.R. 1620.2(1) (1995).
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protection under any of the three tests for coverage, the road to ADA
coverage for the genetically impacted employee is much narrower in
offering opportunities for relief and is almost exclusively dependent upon
the employee's ability to establish the perceptions upon which the
employer acted in regarding the employee as disabled.
CONCLUSION
When confronted with mental disability or genetic issues under the ADA,
the EEOC, and the judiciary seem to be inclined toward extending the
Act's coverage to these conditions provided the employee is able to meet
the threshold qualifying requirements of the Act.
For the worker claiming unlawful discrimination based upon either
currently manifested genetic disorders or the potential for the future
occurrence of a genetically related diseases or illness, attaining coverage
under the Act is a fairly well defined, straightforward process. In order to
succeed on such claims, the complaining individual must establish,
despite the employee's actual condition of health, that the employer
regarded the employee as being substantially limited in the performance
of a major life activity and improperly acted upon this perception.
In dealing with genetic issues, the direction and limitation the EEOC
and courts have set in essentially restricting relief in perceived disability
cases to the standards required in cases of discrimination for manifested
physicial disabilities is correct. To afford an individual asserting an
asymptomatic, genetic predisposition for disease or illness relief on any
lesser standard than required of individuals currently suffering from
expressed, physical impairments would severely undermine the purpose
of the Act. Here, the requirements placed upon the employee asserting
genetic discrimination are neither unreasonable nor biased towards
excluding the genetically impacted worker from the protections afforded
employees who are physically disabled. Again, despite the expected
explosion of twenty-first century scientific progress in unlocking many
more of the mysteries of the human genetic makeup, the current
provisions of the Act for recognizing actionable, genetically based claims
under the ADA seem capable of adapting an increased ability to predict
potential employee health problems.
On the other hand, because of the unique, fragile and elusive nature
of the human mind, coupled with the many subtle, bizarre or dangerous
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disorders with which it can be afflicted, the mentally disabled employee
faces special challenges in the workplace which are generally not
experienced by his physically handicapped or gentically impaired
counterpart. These problems are exacerbated by the lack of consistency
and agreement shown by the courts and EEOC in dealing with mental
disability claims.
Few physical disabilities carry the stigma or evoke the suspicions,
fears and misconceptions in the workplace as does the image of an
employee suffering the effects of a troubled mind. Nonetheless, for the
employee considering exercising his rights under the ADA, the Act
requires the mentally disabled worker to make a reasoned judgment
balancing the risks and benefits of advancing a claim against the possible
adverse effects of disclosing a disabling mental condition to an employer.
In brief the employee must evaluate the difficult and complex questions
as to: whether his claim of disability will be denied because his condition
is medically controlled; whether he will be found to have an ADA
qualified disability without regard to the effect of medical intervention; or
whether the side effects of his drug therapy will carry the day in
establishing a substantial limitation of a major life activity. Since the
EEOC and the courts have, themselves, been unable to agree on the
answers to these key questions, this seems to be an unreasonable burden
to place upon the truly mentally disabled worker as the prerequiste for
realizing his protections under the ADA. If the EEOC truly believes its
own statement that "mental and emotional processes such as thinking
[and] concentrating"'O are major life activities, then it would seem to be
incumbent upon the agency to structure a better process for the employee
suffering from a mental disability to protect his rights under the ADA than
to expect and require a sophisticated exercise of an impaired major
mental life activity, the same as if no disability existed at all.
'See supra note 92.
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